Revisiting the Case for a Populist Central Banker

Francesco Lippi

Working Papers from Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi

Abstract: It is known that discretionary policy may give rise to an infaltionary bias if wages are negotiated in nominal terms. It has recently been argued that this bias can be eliminated, and welfare maximized, by the appointment of a central banker who does not care at all about inflation.

Keywords: WAGES; BANKS; INFLATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E5 J5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Revisiting the case for a populist central banker (2002)
Working Paper: Revisiting the Case for a Populist Central Banker (2000)
Working Paper: Revisiting the Case for a Populist Central Banker (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:banita:386

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