Revisiting the Case for a Populist Central Banker

Francesco Lippi

No 2306, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: It has been argued that the inflationary bias of discretionary monetary policy can be eliminated, and welfare maximized, by the appointment of a central banker who does not care at all about inflation (a 'populist central banker'). We show that this result hinges crucially on the assumption that wage bargaining occurs in terms of the real wage. When the strategic variable chosen by the unions is the nominal wage, the above result is true only in the special case of a single, all-encompassing, union. In the more general case of multiple unions, however, inflation increases linearly with their number and a populist central bank may turn out to be bad for welfare. The paper also shows that whether unions bargain their wages in nominal or in real terms influences the number of channels through which monetary policy can have systematic effects on real variables.

Keywords: Central Bank Conservatism; Monetary Policy Games; Non-Atomism; Wage Setting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E50 J50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-12
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=2306 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Journal Article: Revisiting the case for a populist central banker (2002)
Working Paper: Revisiting the Case for a Populist Central Banker (2000)
Working Paper: Revisiting the Case for a Populist Central Banker (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2306

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=2306

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().