Information, Incentives and Organizations; some Intertemporal Aspects

Trond Olsen and Gaute Torsvik

Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen

Abstract: The paper presents some recent research that examines, in the principal-agent framework, interaction effects of organizational design and incentives in the presence of asymmetric information and limited commitments.

Keywords: INFORMATION; INCENTIVES; BUSINESS ORGANIZATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D82 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bereco:1799

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().