A Theory of Union Power and Labor Turnover

Kai-Uwe Kuhn () and A.J. Padilla

Working Papers from Boston University - Industry Studies Programme

Abstract: In this paper we develop a theory of union power based on the aggregation of bargaining power of individual workers with firm specific skills. Union power depends on the ease of replacement from internal and external labor markets. Unions increase the bargaining power of insiders only in states of the world in which the firm would like to retain insiders but not hire outsiders. We show that union formation leads to inefficient retention of workers in the firm.

Keywords: WAGES; TRADE UNIONS; LABOUR MARKET (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J30 J40 J41 J50 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 1996
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Working Paper: A Theory of Union Power and Labour Turnover (1996)
Working Paper: A Theory of Union Power and Labor Turnover (1996)
Working Paper: A Theory of Union Power and Labor Turnover (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bostin:72

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