A Theory of Union Power and Labor Turnover

Kai-Uwe Kuhn () and A.J. Padilla

Working Papers from Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-

Abstract: In this paper, we develop a theory of union bargaining power based on firm specific skills acquired by the insider workforce. We show that unions increase the bargaining power of insiders only in states of the world in which the firm would like to retain insiders but not hire outsiders.

Keywords: LABOUR MARKET; TRADE UNIONS; WAGES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J30 J41 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 1996
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Related works:
Working Paper: A Theory of Union Power and Labour Turnover (1996)
Working Paper: A Theory of Union Power and Labor Turnover (1996)
Working Paper: A Theory of Union Power and Labor Turnover (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:cemfdt:9601

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