Why the Poor Do not Expropriate the Rich in Democracies: A New Argument

John Roemer

Working Papers from California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs

Keywords: DEMOCRACY; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POVERTY; RESOURCE ALLOCATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D72 I30 I32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages
Date: 1995
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Why the Poor Do not Expropriate the Rich in Democracies: A New Argument (1995)
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