Why the Poor Do not Expropriate the Rich in Democracies: A New Argument

John Roemer

Department of Economics from California Davis - Department of Economics

Keywords: DEMOCRACY; POLITICAL ECONOMY; POVERTY; RESOURCE ALLOCATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D72 I30 I32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 1995
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Why the Poor Do not Expropriate the Rich in Democracies: A New Argument (1995)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:caldec:95-04

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Department of Economics from California Davis - Department of Economics University of California Davis - Department of Economics. One Shields Ave., California 95616-8578. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().