Warlord Competition

Stergios Skaperdas

Working Papers from California Irvine - School of Social Sciences

Abstract: Warlords complete for turf that provides them with rents and "taxable" resources while also providing a semblance of security within their respective territories. Because such competition takes place through the use of force or the threat of the use of force, more competition can lead to lower welfare as resources are wasted on unproductive arming and fighting. Rents crowd out production, in some cases almost cmpletely so.

Keywords: TAXATION; COMPETITION; RENT; PRODUCTION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D24 D4 E23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Journal Article: Warlord Competition (2002)
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