Warlord Competition

Stergios Skaperdas

No DP2001-54, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: Warlords compete for turf that provides them with rents and 'taxable' resources but they can also offer a semblance of security within their respective territories. This article first examines two economic models of warlord competition. Because such competition takes place through the use of force or the threat of the use of force, more competition typically leads to lower material welfare as resources are wasted on unproductive arming and fighting. This is in contrast to ordinary economic models, in which typically greater competition leads to higher material welfare.

Keywords: Game theory; Informal sector; Social conflict; War (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Warlord Competition (2002)
Working Paper: Warlord Competition (2000)
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