Redistribution, Political Power, and Public Goods

Martin McGuire ()

Working Papers from California Irvine - School of Social Sciences

Abstract: As a feature of positive redistribution, what incentive causes those with the power of transferring wealth to stop short of extremes in confiscationand even to a degree to serve the interests of the powerless and the wider soviety as a whole? A beginning approach to this problem has been made by McGuire and Olson (1994, 1996) [hereafter "M-O"]. This paper constructs a simplified, comparative static version of Barro to enrich the M-O analysis of the positive political economy of redistribution.

Keywords: INCOME REDISTRIBUTION; PUBLIC GOODS; PUBLIC POLICY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D33 H23 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Redistribution, Political Power, and Public Goods (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:calirv:98-99-4

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