Redistribution, Political Power, and Public Goods

Martin McGuire ()

Working Papers from California Irvine - School of Social Sciences

Abstract: The core of the argument offered here is that the trade off between these two choices boils down to a benefit cost calculation rather than a Bergsonian or Arrovian value judgement: i.e., in return for the net benefits which a society obtains from the productive, public good supplying activities of a social order, it must pay costs in the form of redistriubtion to favored and powerful groups -- costs which its form of governance exacts. Both the allocative and the redistributive expenditures of governments are financed from taxation or private production/consumption.

Keywords: INCOME REDISTRIBUTION; POLITICS; PUBLIC GOODS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 H23 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Redistribution, Political Power, and Public Goods (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:calirv:99-00-17

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from California Irvine - School of Social Sciences UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, IRVINECALIFORNIA 91717 U.S.A..
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().