The Calculus of Stonewalling

Amihai Glazer and R. Hassin

Working Papers from California Irvine - School of Social Sciences

Abstract: We consider a politician's choice of whether to be evaluated, as by subjecting himself to a detailed interview or by asking for the appointment of a special prosecutor. We find that both when politicians do and do not know the quality of their own actions, stable equilibria may exist in which politicians avoid evaluation, or prefer evaluation by a body which can poorly discriminate between good and bad actions. The ability of voters to distinguish between good and bad politicians may therefore be limited.

Keywords: POLITICS; SOCIAL CHOICE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: The Calculus of Stonewalling (2001)
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