The Calculus of Stonewalling

Amihai Glazer and Refael Hassin

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2001, vol. 13, issue 4, 413-424

Abstract: We consider a politician's choice of whether to be evaluated, either by subjecting himself to a detailed interview or by asking for the appointment of a special prosecutor. If politicians are risk-neutral, then in equilibrium all choose to be evaluated. If politicians are risk-averse, then whether when they do or do not know the quality of their own actions, stable equilibria may exist in which politicians can avoid evaluation, or prefer evaluation by a body which can poorly discriminate between good and bad actions. The ability of voters to distinguish between good and bad politicians may therefore be limited.

Keywords: information; revelation; stonewalling; uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Working Paper: The Calculus of Stonewalling (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:13:y:2001:i:4:p:413-424

DOI: 10.1177/0951692801013004004

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