Bank Monitoring Mitigates Agency Problems: New Evidence Using the Financial Covenants in Bank Loan Commitments

Donald Morgan

Working Papers from Columbia - Graduate School of Business

Keywords: INVESTMENTS; CREDIT; BANKS; ENTERPRISES; FINANCIAL MARKET (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E22 G21 G30 G31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1995
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Bank monitoring mitigates agency problems: new evidence using the financial covenants in bank loan commitments (1993)
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