Bank monitoring mitigates agency problems: new evidence using the financial covenants in bank loan commitments

Donald Morgan

No 93-16, Research Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

Keywords: Bank loans; Liquidity (Economics); Business enterprises (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993
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Working Paper: Bank Monitoring Mitigates Agency Problems: New Evidence Using the Financial Covenants in Bank Loan Commitments (1995)
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