Front-Running by Mutual Fund Managers: It Ain't That bad

Jean-Pierre Danthine and S Moresi

Working Papers from Columbia - Graduate School of Business

Abstract: This paper evaluates the welfare implications of front-running by mutual fund managers. It extends the model of Kyle (1985) to a sitaution in which the insider with fundamentals-information competes against an insider with trade-information and in which noise trading is endogenized.

Keywords: INFORMATION; FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Front-running by Mutual Fund Managers: It ain't that Bad (1996)
Working Paper: Front-Running by Mutual Fund Managers: It Ain't That Bad (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:colubu:96-21

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