Front-Running by Mutual Fund Managers: It Ain't That Bad

Jean-Pierre Danthine and Serge Moresi

Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie

Abstract: This paper evaluates the welfare implications of front-running by mutual fund managers. It extends the model of Kyle (1985) to a situation in which the insider with fundamentals-information competes against an insider with trade-information and in which noise trading in endogenized.

Keywords: front-running; insider trading; noise trading (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 1996-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in European Finance Review, vol. 2 (1), 1998, pp. 29-56

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Related works:
Working Paper: Front-running by Mutual Fund Managers: It ain't that Bad (1996)
Working Paper: Front-Running by Mutual Fund Managers: It Ain't That bad (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:9618

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