Corporate Lobbying in the European Union: Towards a Theory of Access

P. Bouwen

Working Papers from European Institute - Political and Social Sciences

Abstract: The aim of this article is to develop a theoretical framework in order to explain the access of business interests to the European Commission, the Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The degree of access to these institutions is explained interms of a theory of demand and supply of access goods. Access goods concern information that is crucial in the EU policy-making process. Together with the supply, the EU institutions' demand for access goods is therefore carefully studied.

Keywords: THEORY; POLICY MAKING; LOBBYING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:europs:2001/5

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