Contracts and Productive Information Gathering

Jacques Crémer (), Fahad Khalil and Jean Rochet

Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ

Abstract: We modify a standard Baron-Myerson model by assuming that, instead of knowing the cost of nature, the agent has to incur a cost 'g' to learn it.Under these conditions, the principal will offer contracts that, dependingon the value of 'g', try to induce the agent to gather or not to gather information. We study the tradeoffs that are involved.

Keywords: INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Contracts and Productive Information Gathering (1998)
Working Paper: Contracts and Productive Information Gathering (1997)
Working Paper: Contracts and Productive Information Gathering (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:97.468

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