Details about Fahad Khalil
Access statistics for papers by Fahad Khalil.
Last updated 2023-01-06. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pkh360
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Working Papers
2022
- Big Techs vs Banks
BIS Working Papers, Bank for International Settlements
2021
- Competitive Procurement With Ex Post Moral Hazard
CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo 
See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (2021)
2018
- Learning from Failures: Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production
CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo View citations (1)
See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (2020)
2017
- Service-level Selection: Strategic Risk Selection in Medicare Advantage in Response to Risk Adjustment
NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (1)
- The employment impact of microcredit program participation in Bangladesh: Evidence from a longitudinal household survey
GLO Discussion Paper Series, Global Labor Organization (GLO) View citations (1)
See also Journal Article in World Development Perspectives (2019)
- The impacts of intellectual property rights protection on cross-border M&As
Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers, Bank of Finland 
See also Journal Article in Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF) (2017)
2016
- Auctioneers as Market Makers: Managing Momentum in Chittagong Tea Auctions
CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo
2013
- Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats
Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics View citations (6)
Also in CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo (2013) View citations (4)
See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (2013)
- Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information
CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo View citations (1)
Also in Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics (2011) View citations (1)
See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (2015)
2009
- Auctioneers as Agents
2009 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics
- Bribery vs. extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils
Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics 
Also in CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo (2007) View citations (2)
2007
- Monitoring a Common Agent: implications for financial contracting
Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics View citations (10)
Also in CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo (2005)  IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse (2004) 
See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (2007)
2006
- Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment
Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics View citations (41)
Also in ULB Institutional Repository, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles (2006) View citations (41) Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics (2004)
See also Journal Article in Journal of Industrial Economics (2006)
- Optimal Task Design: to integrate or separate planning and implementation?
Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics View citations (29)
See also Journal Article in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy (2006)
2005
- Third Party Purchasing of Health Services: Patient Choice and Agency
Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics View citations (13)
See also Journal Article in Journal of Health Economics (2005)
2001
- Third Party Purchasing and Incentives: The "Outcome Movement" and Contracts for Health Services
Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics, Economic Studies, University of Dundee
2000
- CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring
Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington 
Also in Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics (2000) 
See also Journal Article in Journal of Public Economics (2001)
- On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing
Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington 
Also in Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics (2000)
1997
- Contracts and Productive Information Gathering
Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington View citations (10)
Also in Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics (1997) View citations (2) Working Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ (1997) View citations (3)
See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (1998)
- Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered
Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics View citations (2)
Also in Working Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ (1996) View citations (10) IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse (1996) View citations (1) Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington (1997) View citations (2)
See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (1998)
- The Loan Size as a Commitment Device
Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics View citations (1)
Also in Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington (1997)
See also Journal Article in International Economic Review (1998)
1993
- Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?
Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington
Also in Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics (1993)
See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (1995)
1992
- Auditing Without Commitment
Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington View citations (2)
Also in Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics (1992) View citations (2)
See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (1997)
1991
- Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract
Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics View citations (1)
Also in Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington (1991) View citations (1) IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse (1991) 
See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (1992)
Journal Articles
2022
- Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2022, 31, (3), 762-783
2021
- Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard
RAND Journal of Economics, 2021, 52, (1), 179-206 
See also Working Paper (2021)
2020
- Learning from failures: Optimal contracts for experimentation and production
Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, 190, (C) View citations (2)
See also Working Paper (2018)
2019
- The employment impact of microcredit program participation in Bangladesh: Evidence from a longitudinal household survey
World Development Perspectives, 2019, 13, (C), 34-49 View citations (1)
See also Working Paper (2017)
- Use it or lose it
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2019, 21, (6), 991-1016 View citations (3)
2017
- The Impacts of Intellectual Property Rights Protection on Cross-Border M&As
Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), 2017, 07, (03), 1-35 View citations (1)
See also Working Paper (2017)
2015
- Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information
RAND Journal of Economics, 2015, 46, (4), 872-890 View citations (6)
See also Working Paper (2013)
2013
- Contracts offered by bureaucrats
RAND Journal of Economics, 2013, 44, (4), 686-711 View citations (4)
See also Working Paper (2013)
2010
- Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils
RAND Journal of Economics, 2010, 41, (1), 179-198 View citations (28)
2007
- Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting
Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 135, (1), 35-67 View citations (11)
See also Working Paper (2007)
2006
- INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTIBLE AUDITORS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMITMENT*
Journal of Industrial Economics, 2006, 54, (2), 269-291 View citations (40)
See also Working Paper (2006)
- Optimal Task Design: To Integrate or Separate Planning and Implementation?
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2006, 15, (2), 457-478 View citations (33)
See also Working Paper (2006)
2005
- Third party purchasing of health services: Patient choice and agency
Journal of Health Economics, 2005, 24, (6), 1132-1153 View citations (15)
See also Working Paper (2005)
2001
- Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring
Journal of Public Economics, 2001, 82, (3), 327-347 View citations (9)
See also Working Paper (2000)
1998
- Contracts and Productive Information Gathering
Games and Economic Behavior, 1998, 25, (2), 174-193 View citations (99)
See also Working Paper (1997)
- Loan Size as a Commitment Device
International Economic Review, 1998, 39, (1), 135-50 View citations (45)
See also Working Paper (1997)
- Strategic Information Gathering before a Contract Is Offered
Journal of Economic Theory, 1998, 81, (1), 163-200 View citations (97)
See also Working Paper (1997)
1997
- Auditing Without Commitment
RAND Journal of Economics, 1997, 28, (4), 629-640 View citations (135)
See also Working Paper (1992)
1995
- Collusive Auditors
American Economic Review, 1995, 85, (2), 442-46 View citations (31)
- Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?
Journal of Economic Theory, 1995, 66, (1), 139-157 View citations (47)
See also Working Paper (1993)
1994
- Gathering information before the contract is offered: The case with two states of nature
European Economic Review, 1994, 38, (3-4), 675-682 View citations (33)
1992
- Gathering Information before Signing a Contract
American Economic Review, 1992, 82, (3), 566-78 View citations (134)
See also Working Paper (1991)
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