Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered

Fahad Khalil and Jean Rochet

Working Papers from University of Washington, Department of Economics

Abstract: In a Baron-Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a contract.

Keywords: ECONOMETRICS; INFORMATION; CONTRACTS; DECISION MAKING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D82 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic Information Gathering before a Contract Is Offered (1998)
Working Paper: Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered (1997)
Working Paper: Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract is Offered (1996)
Working Paper: Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract Is Offered (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:udb:wpaper:97-15

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