Bribery vs. extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils

Fahad Khalil, Jacques Lawarree and Sungho Yun

Working Papers from University of Washington, Department of Economics

Date: 2009-07, Revised 2009-07
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Published in RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 41(1), 179–198, Spring 2010

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Working Paper: Bribery vs. Extortion: Allowing the Lesser of two Evils (2007)
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