Details about Jacques Lawarree
Access statistics for papers by Jacques Lawarree.
Last updated 2023-01-04. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pla761
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Working Papers
2021
- Competitive Procurement With Ex Post Moral Hazard
CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo View citations (5)
See also Journal Article Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard, RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation (2021) View citations (5) (2021)
2018
- Learning from Failures: Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production
CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo View citations (1)
See also Journal Article Learning from failures: Optimal contracts for experimentation and production, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (2020) View citations (3) (2020)
2013
- Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats
Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics View citations (7)
Also in CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo (2013) View citations (5)
See also Journal Article Contracts offered by bureaucrats, RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation (2013) View citations (5) (2013)
- Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information
CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo View citations (1)
Also in Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics (2011) View citations (1)
See also Journal Article Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information, RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation (2015) View citations (7) (2015)
2009
- Bribery vs. extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils
Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics 
Also in CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo (2007) View citations (2)
- On the Information Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires
Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics View citations (1)
See also Journal Article On the Information-Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen (2009) View citations (1) (2009)
2006
- Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment
ULB Institutional Repository, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles View citations (41)
Also in Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics (2006) View citations (41) Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics (2004)
See also Journal Article INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTIBLE AUDITORS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMITMENT*, Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell (2006) View citations (40) (2006)
2004
- Exit Option in Hierarchical Agency
Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings, Econometric Society View citations (3)
See also Journal Article Exit option in hierarchical agency, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier (2004) View citations (3) (2004)
2000
- CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring
Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics 
Also in Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington (2000) 
See also Journal Article Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring, Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier (2001) View citations (9) (2001)
- Moral Hazard and Limited Liability
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society
- On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing
Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics
Also in Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington (2000)
1998
- Analysis of Electricity Market Rules and Their Effects on Strategic Behavior in a Non-Congestive Grid
Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics 
Also in Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington (1998)
- Financial Risk Management in a Competitive Electricity Market
Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics 
Also in Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington (1998)
1993
- Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?
Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics
Also in Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington (1993)
See also Journal Article Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (1995) View citations (48) (1995)
- On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion
Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington View citations (1)
Also in Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics (1993) View citations (3)
See also Journal Article On the optimality of allowing collusion, Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier (1996) View citations (65) (1996)
- Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation and Limited Liability
Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington
Also in Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics (1993)
See also Journal Article Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation, and Limited Liability, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (1996) View citations (7) (1996)
1992
- Cost Observation, Auditing and Limited Liability
Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington View citations (3)
Also in Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics (1992) View citations (5)
See also Journal Article Cost observation, auditing and limited liability, Economics Letters, Elsevier (1992) View citations (5) (1992)
1991
- A Prisoner's Dilemma Model of Collusion Deterrence
Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics
Also in Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington (1991)
See also Journal Article A prisoner's dilemma model of collusion deterrence, Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier (1996) View citations (22) (1996)
1990
- Collusion in Hierarchical Agency
Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics
Also in Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington (1990)
See also Journal Article Collusion in Hierarchical Agency, Econometrica, Econometric Society (1993) View citations (189) (1993)
Journal Articles
2022
- Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2022, 31, (3), 762-783 View citations (1)
2021
- Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard
RAND Journal of Economics, 2021, 52, (1), 179-206 View citations (5)
See also Working Paper Competitive Procurement With Ex Post Moral Hazard, CESifo Working Paper Series (2021) View citations (5) (2021)
2020
- Learning from failures: Optimal contracts for experimentation and production
Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, 190, (C) View citations (3)
See also Working Paper Learning from Failures: Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production, CESifo Working Paper Series (2018) View citations (1) (2018)
2019
- Use it or lose it
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2019, 21, (6), 991-1016 View citations (3)
2015
- Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information
RAND Journal of Economics, 2015, 46, (4), 872-890 View citations (7)
See also Working Paper Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information, CESifo Working Paper Series (2013) View citations (1) (2013)
2013
- Contracts offered by bureaucrats
RAND Journal of Economics, 2013, 44, (4), 686-711 View citations (5)
See also Working Paper Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats, Working Papers (2013) View citations (7) (2013)
2010
- Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils
RAND Journal of Economics, 2010, 41, (1), 179-198 View citations (33)
2009
- On the Information-Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2009, 165, (2), 281-306 View citations (1)
See also Working Paper On the Information Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires, Working Papers (2009) View citations (1) (2009)
2006
- INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTIBLE AUDITORS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMITMENT*
Journal of Industrial Economics, 2006, 54, (2), 269-291 View citations (40)
See also Working Paper Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment, ULB Institutional Repository (2006) View citations (41) (2006)
2005
- Organizational Flexibility and Cooperative Task Allocation among Agents
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2005, 161, (4), 621-635 View citations (2)
2004
- Exit option in hierarchical agency
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2004, 22, (8-9), 1265-1287 View citations (3)
See also Working Paper Exit Option in Hierarchical Agency, Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings (2004) View citations (3) (2004)
2001
- Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring
Journal of Public Economics, 2001, 82, (3), 327-347 View citations (9)
See also Working Paper CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring, Working Papers (2000) (2000)
1996
- A prisoner's dilemma model of collusion deterrence
Journal of Public Economics, 1996, 59, (1), 117-136 View citations (22)
See also Working Paper A Prisoner's Dilemma Model of Collusion Deterrence, Working Papers (1991) (1991)
- On the optimality of allowing collusion
Journal of Public Economics, 1996, 61, (3), 383-407 View citations (65)
See also Working Paper On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion, Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington (1993) View citations (1) (1993)
- Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation, and Limited Liability
Journal of Economic Theory, 1996, 71, (2), 514-531 View citations (7)
See also Working Paper Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation and Limited Liability, Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington (1993) (1993)
1995
- Collusive Auditors
American Economic Review, 1995, 85, (2), 442-46 View citations (31)
- Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?
Journal of Economic Theory, 1995, 66, (1), 139-157 View citations (48)
See also Working Paper Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?, Working Papers (1993) (1993)
1993
- Collusion in Hierarchical Agency
Econometrica, 1993, 61, (3), 629-56 View citations (189)
See also Working Paper Collusion in Hierarchical Agency, Working Papers (1990) (1990)
1992
- Cost observation, auditing and limited liability
Economics Letters, 1992, 39, (4), 419-423 View citations (5)
See also Working Paper Cost Observation, Auditing and Limited Liability, Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington (1992) View citations (3) (1992)
1990
- INCITATIONS MANAGERIALES DANS LES ENTREPRISES PUBLIQUES
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 1990, 61, (4), 469-488
1989
- COLLUSION ET AUDIT D'ENTREPRISES PUBLIQUES
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 1989, 60, (2), 217-227
1987
- PRODUCTIVITE, COUT ET CARACTERISTIQUES TECHNOLOGIQUES DES SOCIETES BELGES DE TRANSPORTS URBAINS
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 1987, 58, (4), 369-396 View citations (1)
1986
- Une comparaison empirique des performances des secteurs privé et public: le cas des collectes d'imondices en Belgique
Brussels Economic Review, 1986, 109, 3-31 View citations (4)
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