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Details about Jacques Lawarree

Homepage:http://faculty.washington.edu/lawarree/
Workplace:Department of Economics, University of Washington, (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Jacques Lawarree.

Last updated 2020-04-26. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pla761


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Working Papers

2018

  1. Learning from Failures: Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production
    CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Downloads

2013

  1. Contracts Offered by Bureaucrats
    Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics Downloads View citations (3)
    Also in CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo (2013) Downloads View citations (1)

    See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (2013)
  2. Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information
    CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Downloads View citations (1)
    Also in Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics (2011) Downloads

    See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (2015)

2009

  1. Bribery vs. extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils
    Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics Downloads
    Also in CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo (2007) Downloads View citations (2)
  2. On the Information Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires
    Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) (2009)

2006

  1. Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment
    Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics Downloads View citations (28)
    Also in Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics (2004)
    ULB Institutional Repository, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles (2006) View citations (10)

    See also Journal Article in Journal of Industrial Economics (2006)

2004

  1. Exit Option in Hierarchical Agency
    Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings, Econometric Society View citations (3)
    See also Journal Article in International Journal of Industrial Organization (2004)

2000

  1. CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring
    Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics Downloads
    Also in Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington (2000) Downloads

    See also Journal Article in Journal of Public Economics (2001)
  2. Moral Hazard and Limited Liability
    Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society Downloads
  3. On Commitment and Collusion in Auditing
    Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics
    Also in Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington (2000) Downloads

1998

  1. Analysis of Electricity Market Rules and Their Effects on Strategic Behavior in a Non-Congestive Grid
    Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington Downloads
    Also in Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics (1998) Downloads
  2. Financial Risk Management in a Competitive Electricity Market
    Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics Downloads
    Also in Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington (1998) Downloads

1993

  1. Input Versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?
    Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics
    Also in Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington (1993)

    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (1995)
  2. On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion
    Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington View citations (1)
    Also in Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics (1993) View citations (3)

    See also Journal Article in Journal of Public Economics (1996)
  3. Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation and Limited Liability
    Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington
    Also in Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics (1993)

    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (1996)

1992

  1. Cost Observation, Auditing and Limited Liability
    Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington View citations (2)
    Also in Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics (1992) View citations (2)

    See also Journal Article in Economics Letters (1992)

1991

  1. A Prisoner's Dilemma Model of Collusion Deterrence
    Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics
    Also in Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington (1991)

    See also Journal Article in Journal of Public Economics (1996)

1990

  1. Collusion in Hierarchical Agency
    Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington, Department of Economics at the University of Washington
    Also in Working Papers, University of Washington, Department of Economics (1990)

    See also Journal Article in Econometrica (1993)

Journal Articles

2019

  1. Use it or lose it
    Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2019, 21, (6), 991-1016 Downloads

2015

  1. Private monitoring, collusion, and the timing of information
    RAND Journal of Economics, 2015, 46, (4), 872-890 Downloads View citations (3)
    See also Working Paper (2013)

2013

  1. Contracts offered by bureaucrats
    RAND Journal of Economics, 2013, 44, (4), 686-711 Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper (2013)

2010

  1. Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils
    RAND Journal of Economics, 2010, 41, (1), 179-198 Downloads View citations (14)

2009

  1. On the Information-Gathering Role of Firm-Sponsored Training for New Hires
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2009, 165, (2), 281-306 Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper (2009)

2006

  1. INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTIBLE AUDITORS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMITMENT*
    Journal of Industrial Economics, 2006, 54, (2), 269-291 Downloads View citations (12)
    See also Working Paper (2006)

2005

  1. Organizational Flexibility and Cooperative Task Allocation among Agents
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2005, 161, (4), 621-635 Downloads View citations (1)

2004

  1. Exit option in hierarchical agency
    International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2004, 22, (8-9), 1265-1287 Downloads View citations (3)
    See also Working Paper (2004)

2001

  1. Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring
    Journal of Public Economics, 2001, 82, (3), 327-347 Downloads View citations (8)
    See also Working Paper (2000)

1996

  1. A prisoner's dilemma model of collusion deterrence
    Journal of Public Economics, 1996, 59, (1), 117-136 Downloads View citations (21)
    See also Working Paper (1991)
  2. On the optimality of allowing collusion
    Journal of Public Economics, 1996, 61, (3), 383-407 Downloads View citations (50)
    See also Working Paper (1993)
  3. Optimal Contract, Imperfect Output Observation, and Limited Liability
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1996, 71, (2), 514-531 Downloads View citations (6)
    See also Working Paper (1993)

1995

  1. Collusive Auditors
    American Economic Review, 1995, 85, (2), 442-46 Downloads View citations (21)
  2. Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1995, 66, (1), 139-157 Downloads View citations (30)
    See also Working Paper (1993)

1993

  1. Collusion in Hierarchical Agency
    Econometrica, 1993, 61, (3), 629-56 Downloads View citations (154)
    See also Working Paper (1990)

1992

  1. Cost observation, auditing and limited liability
    Economics Letters, 1992, 39, (4), 419-423 Downloads View citations (4)
    See also Working Paper (1992)

1990

  1. INCITATIONS MANAGERIALES DANS LES ENTREPRISES PUBLIQUES
    Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 1990, 61, (4), 469-488 Downloads

1989

  1. COLLUSION ET AUDIT D'ENTREPRISES PUBLIQUES
    Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 1989, 60, (2), 217-227 Downloads

1987

  1. PRODUCTIVITE, COUT ET CARACTERISTIQUES TECHNOLOGIQUES DES SOCIETES BELGES DE TRANSPORTS URBAINS
    Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 1987, 58, (4), 369-396 Downloads View citations (1)

1986

  1. Une comparaison empirique des performances des secteurs privé et public: le cas des collectes d'imondices en Belgique
    Brussels Economic Review, 1986, 109, 3-31 Downloads
 
Page updated 2020-08-15