A Prisoner's Dilemma Model of Collusion Deterrence

F. Kofman and Jacques Lawarree

Working Papers from University of Washington, Department of Economics

Keywords: information; contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 1991
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Journal Article: A prisoner's dilemma model of collusion deterrence (1996)
Working Paper: A Prisoner's Dilemma Model of Collusion Deterrence (1991)
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