Incentives for Corruptible Auditors in the Absence of Commitment

Fahad Khalil and Jacques Lawarree

Working Papers from University of Washington, Department of Economics

Date: 2004-10
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Forthcoming in Journal of Industrial Economics

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Journal Article: INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTIBLE AUDITORS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMITMENT* (2006)
Working Paper: Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment (2006)
Working Paper: Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment (2006)
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