Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment

Fahad Khalil and Jacques Lawarree

Working Papers from University of Washington, Department of Economics

Date: 2006-11
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Published in Journal of Industrial Economics, Volume 15/2, 457-478, 2006

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Related works:
Journal Article: INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTIBLE AUDITORS IN THE ABSENCE OF COMMITMENT* (2006)
Working Paper: Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment (2006)
Working Paper: Incentives for Corruptible Auditors in the Absence of Commitment (2004)
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