The Loan Size as a Commitment Device

Fahad Khalil and B-M Parigi

Working Papers from University of Washington, Department of Economics

Abstract: We model risky lending with costly state verification but without commitment to an audit strategy. The borrower under-reports with a positive probability in the successful state, and the lender audits with a positive probability after a report of failure.

Keywords: INFORMATION; CREDIT; FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Loan Size as a Commitment Device (1998)
Working Paper: The Loan Size as a Commitment Device (1997)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:udb:wpaper:97-08

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Washington, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael Goldblatt ().