Anti-Competitive Financial Contracting: the Design of Financial Claims

Giacinta Cestone () and Lawrence White

Working Papers from Toulouse - GREMAQ

Abstract: In this paper we show that the "Coase problem" of the private oversupply of inputs applies equally to investors supplying capital to firms. Investors would like to commit to supplying only the monopoly amount of capital to an industry, but ex-post may be tempted to fund a second firm, devaluing the investment of the first entrepreneur.

Keywords: CAPITAL; COMPETITION; BUSINESS FINANCING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 1999
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Related works:
Working Paper: Anti-Competitive Financial Contracting: The Design of Financial Claims (2002)
Working Paper: ANTI-COMPETITIVE FINANCIAL CONTRACTING: THE DESIGN OF FINANCIAL CLAIMS
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:gremaq:99.525

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