Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium

Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers from Harvard - Institute of Economic Research

Date: 1996
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Related works:
Journal Article: Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (1999)
Working Paper: Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (1999)
Working Paper: Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (1999)
Working Paper: Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (1999)
Working Paper: Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium
Working Paper: Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium
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