Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium

David Levine, Eddie Dekel and Drew Fudenberg

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: In a self-confirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents would respond to deviations. This paper develops a refinement of self-confirming equilibrium in which players use information about opponents' payoffs in forming beliefs about the way that opponents play off of the equilibrium path. We show that this concept is robust to payoff uncertainty. We also discuss its relationship to other concepts and show that it is closely related to assuming almost common certainty of payoffs in an epistemic model with independent beliefs.

Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (41)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory

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http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3200614/fudenberg_payoff.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (1999)
Working Paper: Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (1999)
Working Paper: Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (1999)
Working Paper: Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium (1996)
Working Paper: Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium
Working Paper: Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:3200614

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