Implementation and Renegotiation
Eric Maskin and
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers from Harvard - Institute of Economic Research
The paper characterises the choice rules that can be implemented when agents are unable to commit themselves not to renegotiate the mechanism.
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Journal Article: Implementation and Renegotiation (1999)
Working Paper: Implementation and renegotiation (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:harver:1863
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