Implementation and Renegotiation

Eric Maskin and John Moore

The Review of Economic Studies, 1999, vol. 66, issue 1, 39-56

Abstract: The paper characterizes the choice rules that can be implemented when agents are unable to commit themselves not to renegotiate the mechanism.

Date: 1999
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Working Paper: Implementation and Renegotiation (1999)
Working Paper: Implementation and renegotiation (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:66:y:1999:i:1:p:39-56.

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