Competing Auctions

Glenn Allison and Drew Fudenberg

No 1960, Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers from Harvard - Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: This paper studies the conditions under which two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium, without the larger one attracting all of the smaller one’s patrons. We find that the range of equilibrium market sizes depends on the aggregate buyer-seller ratio, and also whether the markets are especially "thin. "

Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Competing Auctions (2010)
Working Paper: Competing Auctions (2010)
Journal Article: Competing Auctions (2004)
Working Paper: Competing Auctions (2004)
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