Competing Auctions

Glenn Ellison (), Markus Mobius () and Drew Fudenberg

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper shows that larger auctions are more efficient than smaller ones, but that despite this scale effect, two competing and otherwise identical markets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium. We find that the range of equilibrium market sizes depends on the aggregate buyer—seller ratio, and also whether the markets are especially thin.

Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

Published in Journal of the European Economic Association

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http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3043414/Ellison_CompetingAuctions.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Competing Auctions (2010)
Working Paper: Competing Auctions (2010)
Journal Article: Competing Auctions (2004)
Working Paper: Competing Auctions (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:3043414

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