Consistency and Egalitarianism: The Egalitarian Set

Javier Arin () and Elena Inarra

ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica from ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists)

Abstract: In this paper we extend an egalitarian solution for two-person games to n-person cooperative games so that the estalished standard is observed for every two agents of the game.

Keywords: GAME; THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 4 pages
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:inecpu:163

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