A Simple Model of First Price Auction with Resale

M. Gupta and Bernard Lebrun ()

Working Papers from Laval - Recherche en Energie

Abstract: If there is asymmetry among the bidders taking part in a first price auction, the equilibrium is not expost efficient. We consider a simple model of first price auction among two bidders where resale always occurs in case of inefficiency. We obtain mathematical formulas for the equilibrium strategies. We study properties of the equilibrium, derive some results of comparative statics and compare the revenue accruing to the auctioneer with his revenue in other auction procedures.

Keywords: PRICING; AUCTIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: A Simple Model of First Price Auction with Resale (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:lavaen:98-08

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