A Simple Model of First Price Auction with Resale

Bernard Lebrun () and Madhurima Gupta

Cahiers de recherche from Université Laval - Département d'économique

Abstract:

If there is asymmetry among the bidders taking part in a first price auction, the equilibrium is not expost efficient. We consider a simple model of first price auction among two bidders where resale always occurs in case of inefficiency. We obtain mathematical formulas for the equilibrium strategies. We study properties of the equilibrium, derive some results of comparative statics and compare the revenue accruing to the auctioneer with his revenue in other auction procedures.

JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Working Paper: A Simple Model of First Price Auction with Resale (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:laeccr:9819

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