Technical Efficiency Under Alternative Regulatory Regimes: Evidence from the Inter-War Britich Gas Industry

Christopher Hammond, G. Jones and T. Robinson

Working Papers from Universite de Nantes - Economie Internationale et de l'Entreprise

Abstract: From 1920 until nationalisation, privately owned gas companies in Britain were regulated under one of three systems: the Maximum Price, the Sliding Scale, or the Basic Price system. In effect, the industry was the subject of a remarkable experiment in regulation. Hitherto, there has been no empirical analysis of the incentive properties of the regimes applied. This paper attempts such an investigation by using Data Envelopment Analysis to estimate the relative efficiency of a sample of undertakings under each system. Undertakings operating under the basic price system are found to be more efficient which suggests that incentive regulation was effective in the industry at this time.

Keywords: NATURAL GAS; REGULATION; PRICING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 L90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2000
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Journal Article: Technical Efficiency under Alternative Regulatory Regimes: Evidence from the Inter-war British Gas Industry (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:nantie:280

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