Increasing Dominance with No Efficiency Effect

Luis Cabral

New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires from New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-

Abstract: I uncover a new force towards increasing dominance. The new effect results from the strategic choice of covariance in races. I assume that players must choose not the amount of resources to spend but how to allocate those resources. I show that the laggard has an incentive to chose a different path from the leader.

Keywords: COMPETITION; RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT; TRADE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: Increasing Dominance with No Efficiency Effect (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:nystfi:00-06

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