Bargaining Over an Uncertain Outcome: The Role of Beliefs

Antoine Billot and Itzhak Gilboa

Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: We study the Nash bargaining solution of a problem in which two agents bargain over an uncertain outcome. Under the assumption of constant absolute risk aversion, we study the way that solution varies, ex ante, when we vary the beliefs of one agent. Changing an agent's beliefs in a way that makes them "more distant" from the other agent's beliefs makes the second agent better off.

Keywords: RISK; OUTCOME; BELIEF (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2000
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Related works:
Working Paper: Bargaining over an uncertain outcome: the role of beliefs (2002)
Working Paper: Bargaining over an uncertain outcome: the role of beliefs (2002)
Working Paper: Bargaining Over an Uncertain Outcome: The Role of Beliefs (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pariem:2000.73

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