Bargaining over an uncertain outcome: the role of beliefs

Antoine Billot, Alain Chateauneuf, Itzhak Gilboa and Jean-Marc Tallon

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: We study the Nash bargaining solution of a problem in which two agents bargain over an uncertain outcome. Under the assumptions of risk neutrality and of constant absolute risk aversion, we study the way that the solution varies, ex ante, when we vary the beliefs of one agent. Changing an agent's beliefs in a way that makes them "more distant" from the other agent's beliefs makes the second agent better off.

Keywords: risk; games; outcome (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-05-01
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Published in Decisions in Economics and Finance, 2002, Vol.25, n°1, pp.33-45. ⟨10.1007/s102030200002⟩

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Related works:
Working Paper: Bargaining over an uncertain outcome: the role of beliefs (2002)
Working Paper: Bargaining Over an Uncertain Outcome: The Role of Beliefs (2001)
Working Paper: Bargaining Over an Uncertain Outcome: The Role of Beliefs (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00481313

DOI: 10.1007/s102030200002

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