Repeated Proximity Games

Jérôme Renault and Tristan Tomala

Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: We consider repeated games of complete information and imperfect monitoring, where the observation structure is given by a directed graph, i.e. all what a player learns are the actions taken by his neighbours on the graph. We prove that a generalized folk theorem holds if and only if the graph is 2-connected: this means that manipulation of information transmission by one player is impossible if and only if no player is essential for communication. We finally extend this result to the contexts of correlated equilibrium, sequential equilibrium and finitely repeated games.

Keywords: GAMES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: Repeated proximity games (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pariem:97.14

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