Repeated proximity games

Jérôme Renault and Tristan Tomala

International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 27, issue 4, 539-559

Abstract: We consider repeated games with complete information and imperfect monitoring, where each player is assigned a fixed subset of players and only observes the moves chosen by the players in this subset. This structure is naturally represented by a directed graph. We prove that a generalized folk theorem holds for any payoff function if and only if the graph is 2-connected, and then extend this result to the context of finitely repeated games.

Keywords: Repeated; games; ·; Folk; theorem; ·; imperfect; monitoring; ·; graphs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-12-16
Note: Received June 1997/Revised version March 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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Working Paper: Repeated Proximity Games (1997)
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