Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economics

Francoise Forges, A. Heifetz and Enrico Minelli

Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.

Abstract: If the allocation of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state - contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed as an element of the core of the n-fold replicated economy, for every n. The converse holds under the further assumption of independent private values but not in general, as shown by a counter-example.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; INFORMATION U.F.R. de science economiques, gestion, mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 9 2001 Nanterre CEDEX. 24p. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D51 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Related works:
Journal Article: Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies (2001)
Working Paper: Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies (2001)
Working Paper: Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies (1999)
Working Paper: Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economies (1999)
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