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Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economies

Francoise Forges, A. Heifetz and Enrico Minelli

Working Papers from Tel Aviv

Abstract: If the allocations of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state -contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex-ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibria allocation can be viewed as an element of the core of the n-fold replicated economy, for every n. The converse holds under the further assumption of independent private values but not in general, as shown by a counter-example.

Keywords: ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM; COMPETITION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D00 D40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Journal Article: Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies (2001) Downloads
Working Paper: Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies (2001)
Working Paper: Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies (1999)
Working Paper: Incentive Compatible Core and Competitive Equilibria in Differential Information Economics (1999)
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