Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy

Avinash Dixit and E. Helpman

Working Papers from Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs

Abstract: We develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with non-transferable utility, and prove that the principales'Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action.

Keywords: LOBBYING; AUCTIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Working Paper: Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy (1996)
Working Paper: Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy (1996)
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