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Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Tax Policy

A. Dexit, Gene Grossman and E. Helpman

Working Papers from Tel Aviv

Abstract: We develop a model of common agency with complete information and general preferences with non-transferable utility, and prove that the principals'Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies implements an efficient action. We apply this theory to construct a positive model of public finance, where organized special interests acan lobby the government for consumer and producer taxes or subsidies and targeted lump-sum taxes or transfers.

Keywords: INFORMATION; ECONOMIC MODELS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D70 D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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