Electoral Competition with Policy Compromise

Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman

Working Papers from Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs

Abstract: We study the electoral competition between two parties vying for seats in a legislature. The electorate includes knowledgeable voters and impressionable voters, the latter susceptivle for influence over the platforms. A special interest group provides campaign financing in exchange for influence over the platforms.

Keywords: LOBBYING; VOTING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Electoral Competition with Policy Compromise (1996)
Working Paper: Electoral Competition with Policy Compromise (1996)
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