Electoral Competition with Policy Compromise

Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman

Working Papers from Tel Aviv

Abstract: We study the electoral competition between two parties vying for seats in a legislature. The electorate includes knowledgeable voters and impressionable voters, the later susceptible to electioneering activities.

Keywords: ELECTIONS; COMPETITION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 1996
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Working Paper: Electoral Competition with Policy Compromise (1996)
Working Paper: Electoral Competition with Policy Compromise (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:teavfo:10-96

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