THE ROLE OF PROXY CONTESTS IN THE GOVERNANCE OF PUBLICLY- HELD CORPORATIONS

H. Deangelo and L. Deangelo

Working Papers from Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center

Keywords: decision making; information exchange; public enterprises (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1988
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